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The proliferation of enemy threat capabilities necessitates increased innovation 
and a shift in tactical paradigm. The latest strategy pursued by the U.S. Navy is the 
concept of distributed lethality (DL), an offensive concept that utilizes small groups of 
ships incorporating deception techniques and distributed weapon systems in order to gain 
a tactical advantage. This thesis applies a standardized systems engineering approach to 
investigate the impact of conducting existing integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) 
operations in the context of this DL concept. An analysis is conducted through the 
development of an integrated systems architecture and the evaluation of the defined 
architecture using discrete event simulation. The analysis identifies key performance 
drivers and operational decisions that balance conflicting requirements for IAMD and 
DL. The results indicate an average of 11 percent increase in the number of enemy forces 
killed when conducting a combined mission. This improved lethality required increased 
vulnerability, resulting in an average increase of half of a hit on defended assets. While 
the core concepts of DL and IAMD are vastly different, a combined architecture will 
result in efficient execution of both missions and increased effectiveness of naval forces. 
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Early 2015 marked the introduction of a new offensive concept. This emerging 
concept has resulted in the buildup of offensive capability for U.S. naval forces. Defined 
as the concept of distributed lethality (DL), Admirals Peter Fanta, Peter Gumataotao, and 
Thomas Rowden described a naval force that would be composed of small adaptive force 
packages (AFPs) that could operate in a dispersed and deceptive manner (Fanta, 
Gumataotao, and Rowden 2015). The development of these new offensive capabilities 
has spurred increased attention to the pursuit of key technologies as well as the pursuit of 
refined doctrine and tactics that will allow maritime forces to project offensive power in 
forward deployed and contested environments.  
This thesis investigates the impacts of a current mission set, namely integrated air 
and missile defense (IAMD), on the newly proposed DL concept. The combined mission 
of IAMD is a result of conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations in concert 
with an air defense (AD) mission. In stark contrast to the concept of distributed lethality, 
IAMD relies heavily on robust communication paths as well as emission of high-powered 
shipboard radars to detect and engage missile threats, whereas DL missions seek to 
minimize detectable emissions and rely on the element of stealth and low probability of 
detection techniques. 
An architecture proposed by Johnson (2016) to analyze the DL concept describes 
a distributed force. Additionally, Harlow (2016) applied a model-based systems 
engineering (MBSE) approach to investigate the logistical component of DL. To add to 
the body of work, the author developed a combined DL and IAMD architecture that will 
provide a framework for a combat system design that can satisfy the complex 
requirements of the two diverse warfare areas. An investigation of the impacts of IAMD 
on DL was conducted using MBSE and discrete event simulation.  
The architecture for this thesis was developed using a schema, which ensured full 
traceability of the architectural elements. The schema defined an architecture creation 
process that began with the identification of requirements to fulfill combined DL/IAMD 
 xviii 
missions. It then ensured that requirements were traced to mission capabilities, as defined 
by the joint capabilities areas (JCAs). The defined mission capabilities were achieved by 
operational activities adapted from the Unified Naval Task List (UNTL) and enabled by 
unique operational tasks. The functional and physical architecture was created in 
Innoslate, an architecture development software created by SPEC industries.  
By adopting the architecture developed in Innoslate, discrete event simulation was 
conducted using ExtendSim 9 software and a robust design of experiments (DOE). 
Statistical analysis of the simulation results was used to investigate the level of 
significance that selected input factors have on the outputs selected as measure of 
effectiveness (MOEs) of the systems. The input factors consider 150 distinct factors that 
include blue force composition and capabilities, red force composition and capabilities, 
sensor capabilities, mission type, emissions control (EMCON) condition. Each of the 
input factors was evaluated using regression analysis against two different MOEs, percent 
of targets destroyed and blue force vulnerability. Results indicated an average of 11 
percent increase in the number of enemy forces killed when conducting a combined 
mission versus conducting just an IAMD mission. The cost of this improved lethality was 
increased vulnerability, resulting in an average increase of half of a hit on defended 
assets.   
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Modern naval warfare has evolved dramatically in the past century. U.S. naval 
forces have focused primarily on defensive weapon system development. This is evident 
through an examination of the recent U.S. Navy major ship system developments, 
specifically the AEGIS weapon system (AWS), Ships Self Defense System (SSDS), and 
even AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD) System. All these systems have one key 
theme in their development: defense of assets.  
Recently, there has been a shift in the warfighting mentality of some key Navy 
leaders; specifically, the Commander of Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) is showing a 
renewed interest in developing offensive capabilities. Development of these offensive 
capabilities has spurred increased attention to the pursuit of key technologies as well as 
the pursuit of refined doctrine and tactics that will allow maritime forces to project 
offensive power in forward deployed and contested environments. An emerging concept 
in this buildup of offensive capability is the concept of distributed lethality (DL) (Fanta, 
Gumataotao, and Rowden 2015). 
1. Distributed Lethality 
The key tenet of DL is to keep the enemy at risk, at range—that is, their asset 
commanders must feel a sense of danger while being forced to maintain safe distances 
from perceived adversarial forces. A key enabler of this tenet is maintaining battlespace 
awareness (BA), which is defined by the U.S. Navy Information Dominance Roadmap 
2013–2028 as “the ability to understand the disposition and intentions of potential 
adversaries as well as the characteristics and conditions of the operations environment” 
(Department of the Navy [DON] 2013). The situational awareness gained through 
comprehensive BA allows commanders to understand their environment and further 
disrupt adversarial forces intended tactics using DL. Incorporating the DL concept 
involves geographically distributing naval forces. This helps to create an increased level 
of uncertainty in the mission planning of opposing forces. This uncertainty creates a 
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perceived risk for the enemy commanders and therefore may result in delayed troop 
movements or in the abandonment of a preconceived mission set.  
When executed properly a distributed force will have the ability to keep enemy 
forces at greater ranges. The ability to keep forces at range is dependent upon the 
capabilities of the naval forces to project power. When friendly forces have systems that 
allow for the projection of power at greater ranges than the enemy forces, then the 
opposing force commanders will have to consider this increased risk, which will keep 
their forces distributed and at increased range from the objective. Therefore, by properly 
executing the DL concept, friendly forces experience an increased level of security, 
which enables increased sea control in a given maritime domain.  
2. Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
This emphasis on power projection is vitally important to increasing the offensive 
capability of a naval force; naval warfare is not restricted to a single domain or concept 
such as DL. The evolution of warfighting has led to the requirement to fight in a multi-
domain warfare environment. To this end, it is important to consider the emergence of 
maritime integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), which results from an evolution of 
warfighting. No longer is a naval surface unit able to only perform local air defense, a 
unit must now perform air defense and missile defense missions in concert with one 
another. Joint Publication 3–01 defines Integrated Air and Missile Defense as “The 
integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland and United 
States national interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating 
an adversary’s ability to create adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities” 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017, I-10). Simply stated IAMD is a mission set 
that includes both air defense and ballistic missile defense (BMD). 
The advent of IAMD highlighted the vital importance that anytime a new concept 
is derived, time and research must be devoted to consider the implication of this new 
concept. Specifically, the combination of AW and BMD to evolve to what is now known 
as IAMD came with some complications. In a 2016 paper, Morton (2016) points out that 
it was not until the development of the multi-mission signal processor (MMSP) for the 
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Spy-1D radar that this capability (IAMD) could be realized. The earlier BMD computer 
suites utilized separated signal processers and that resulted in a degradation of AW 
capability while operating in BMD mode (Morton 2016, 111). The new MMSP reduced 
the burden on the crew while increasing the effectiveness of the SPY-1D radar suite and 
provided enhanced engagement capability in littoral environments as well as 
engagements against sea skimming anti-ship cruise missiles in high-clutter environments. 
To this end, one must evaluate the DL mission for potential architectural elements that 
may be saturated or overtasked.  
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Defined research methods govern thesis research. The goal of this thesis is (1) to 
define architectures for IAMD and associated DL forces, and (2) to analyze the 
performance of those DL forces in an IAMD mission. Accordingly, this thesis utilizes the 
analysis research method (Giachetti 2016), which focuses the research on assessment of 
IAMD performance in a DL environment using in-depth quantitative and computational 
analysis.  
The selection of the analysis research method informs the structure of the 
finalized thesis. The first two chapters present an introduction as well as literature 
relevant to both the IAMD and DL concepts. Chapter III defines the requirements, 
functions, and components required for the development of executable architectures. 
Chapter IV presents and analyzes a discrete event simulation that models the 
effectiveness of various force compositions, as well as the resource constraints that affect 
operational effectiveness, in both a DL and IAMD mission. Analysis of results identifies 
key performance drivers and operational decisions that balance conflicting requirements 
for both mission sets.  
This method takes advantage of the waterfall model used in Systems Engineering 
(SE), introduced by Royce in 1970. An examination of Figure 1 depicts this waterfall 
process. The process starts with the analysis of requirements and finishes with the testing of 
the candidate designs. The power of this process is in the feedback loops, which can take 
place at any step of the process and allow for continued improvement of the product. 
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Figure 1.  Waterfall Process Model. Adapted from Royce (1970). 
C. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The value of this study is identification of architectures that can satisfy IAMD 
performance standards in the context of a DL mission. By identifying the shared 
resources and modeling their interactions, one can identify potential constraints in design 
are isolated and high performing force compositions (in both DL and IAMD missions) 
are identified. 
The content of this thesis presents the following research objectives. 
 It utilizes standardized systems architecture tools and techniques to 
integrate architectures for IAMD and DL. 
 It develops and analyzes a discrete event simulation consistent with the 
systems architecture that identifies key performance drivers and 










II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
Architecting supports decisions. The 1995 Department of Defense integrated 
architecture panel defined an architecture as “the structure of components, their inter-
relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over 
time” (Van Haren 2011, 9). This implies that there must be a way to organize, capture, 
and display information. By presenting large amounts of data into concise and tailored 
views, decision makers can develop informed decisions regarding complex issues. 
Architecture provides a means of constructing a mental picture of the system. It also 
allows for the design of a system using non-verbal methods such as diagrams and 
illustrations, which facilitates the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge 
and informs meaningful conversations.  
This thesis leverages the Tier 1 Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture 
created for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the J6 directorate (see Appendix A) as many of 
these systems have been placed in production. By examining the existing IAMD 
architecture an understanding of the system can be developed, which facilitates the 
creation of an advanced architecture to include DL.  
The development of a combined DL and IAMD architecture provides a 
framework for developing a complete combat system design that can satisfy the complex 
requirements of the two diverse warfare areas. Architecture development must be done in 
a methodical and deliberate fashion ensuring that all elements of the systems are 
considered and that relevant missions are addressed. To this end, careful mapping of the 
systems will take place to ensure complete traceability of system functions, components, 
tasks, capabilities as well as providing clearly defined requirements. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Distributed Lethality Review 
Work to define DL has been advancing at a rapid pace as demonstrated by some 
recent thesis work. Johnson (2016) described a potential architecture for a distributed 
force. Johnson took a structured approach to defining the core requirements for DL as 
well as describing the capabilities needed to achieve those requirements. His paper goes 
on to define a potential systems architecture for operational DL and began the process of 
developing connections and relationships between various elements of his DL model.  
Harlow (2016) described the logistical component of DL by utilizing a model-
based systems engineering (MBSE) approach. His work looked at the stakeholder 
requirements for the system and identified the necessary operational architecture to 
support a distributed force. Harlow developed an architecture that provides a traceable, 
flexible and scalable architecture, which aids in codifying the DL concept, but he also 
stated that there is an opportunity for follow-on research that would focus on identifying 
specific measures of performance and conducting detailed modeling and simulation. 
A 2017 report published by the Office of the Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
(CNSF) titled Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control describes the United States’ 
return to sea control.  
Sea control is the precondition for everything else we must do as a navy. 
Distributed Lethality reinforces fleet initiatives that drive collaboration 
and integration across warfighting domains. Distributed Lethality requires 
increasing the offensive and defensive capability of surface forces, and 
guides deliberate resource investment for modernization and for the future 
force. (CNSF 2017, 2) 
Furthermore, the concept of DL is broken down into three key tenets: increase the 
offensive lethality of all warships, distribute offensive capability geographically, and give 
the right mix of resources to persist in a fight. Clearly, the DL mission is progressing at a 
rapid pace; however, the right mix of resources to conduct a DL mission must be 
considered in the context of a naval force’s ability to continue to conduct defensive 
missions such as IAMD.  
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2. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Review 
Senior military officials view IAMD as a joint capability to be employed at the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels of war (Morton 2016, 111). However, this 
document will consider only the surface warfare or maritime view of IAMD. Figure 2 
provides an operational context to the operation of a joint IAMD mission.  
 
Figure 2.  Surface Warfare View of IAMD in the Joint Environment. 
Source: Kilby (2013). 
When conducted in a maritime environment, joint forces require wide variety of 
assets to complete a successful IAMD operation. The assets required include guided 
missile cruisers (CG) and guided missile destroyers (DDG) equipped with BMD capable 
AEGIS weapon systems with robust command and control systems, including link-11, 
link-16, and cooperative engagement capability (CEC). CEC provides a sensor network 
that allows for the exchange of fire control quality data between participating units. This 
fire control quality data can enable extended range engagement opportunities. The 
military accomplishes engagement of air threats with standard missile variants SM-2 and 
SM-6. They engage ballistic threats using SM-3 and SM-6 for space based engagement 
and terminal engagement of ballistic targets, respectively. Airborne assets such the F/A-
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18, E-2D and F-35 aid in providing increased situational awareness, defense in depth as 
well as offensive capabilities. Finally, the inclusion of navy integrated fire control-
counter air (NIFC-CA) allows for a capability that dramatically increases the sensor’s 
ability and allows for missile engagement past ship’s organic radar horizon.  
In stark contrast to the concept of distributed lethality, the operational view 
presented in Figure 2 relies heavily on robust communication paths as well as on 
emission of high-powered shipboard radars to detect and engage missile threats, while 
DL missions seek to minimize all detectable emissions and rely on the element of stealth 
and low probability of detection techniques. 
In the Joint IAMD Vision 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
outlined imperatives that must be considered in future IAMD development. The final 
imperative laid out is to “create an awareness of the IAMD mission and the benefits of its 
proper utilization across the Department of Defense to include the development of the 
enabling framework of concepts, doctrine, acquisition and war plans that support full 
integration of the IAMD into combat operations” (CJCS 2013, 5). Ensuring that IAMD is 
fully integrated in the DL concept is consistent with the imperative set forth by the CJCS. 
C. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Model Based Systems Engineering is a powerful tool in which ideas can be 
organized, displayed, explained, and evaluated. Through the use of established DOD 
Architecture Framework (DODAF), which is implemented in Innoslate, the software tool 
developed by Systems and Proposal Engineering Company (SPEC Innovations); this 
thesis defined boundaries, needs requirements, goals and functions of both DL and IAMD 
architectures. Additionally, the complete architecture informed the creation of a complex 
engagement model using ExtendSim9, a discrete event-simulation software program 
developed by Imagine That Inc. Creation of that model allows for detailed analysis of 
system behaviors and interactions. Figure 3 depicts how this defined architecture allowed 
for the analysis and evaluation of the system, which feeds the decision-making process 
and allows for courses of action to influence decisions and define an evaluated 
architecture which supports both mission areas. 
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Figure 3.  Architectures Influence in the Decision Making Process. Adapted 
from Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (2017). 
1. DOD Architecture Framework 
The Department of Defense (DOD) follows a six-step process in the high-level 
development of architecture products, as shown in Figure 4 (Department of Defense 
Chief Information Officer 2017). Step one involves determining the use of the 
architecture. This step is accomplished through the evaluation of the objectives, purpose, 
tradeoffs and requirements of the architecture. Early consideration of analysis methods 
also occurs during this phase but may be revised at later stages as the project matures. 
These tradeoff considerations are vital to the core of the ability of the thesis evaluate 
further the interactions that may occur when IAMD missions are accomplished in a DL 
environment. By considering the tradeoffs that must be made, design changes can be 
incorporated at lower cost when compared to implementation at later stages. 
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Figure 4.  Architecture Development Six-Step Process. Source: Department of 
Defense Chief Information Officer (2017). 
The second step of the DODAF process is determination of the scope of the 
architecture, which involves defining the boundaries and establishing the depth and 
breadth of the architectural description effort. Clear definition of the scope, operational 
boundaries, as well as physical boundaries, ensures that one places the correct focus is 
placed on the area of concern and avoids broad scoping which could lead to insufficient 
detailed process definitions. To this end, the author has chosen to scope this thesis in a 
restricted maritime IAMD scenario with scenarios that depict DL, IAMD and combined 
operations against a near peer adversary in a contested environment.  
The third step in the process is determining the data required to support the 
architecture development and is directly supportive of completing step four, the 
collection, organization, correlation and storage of data. The DODAF goes on to state 
that data collection and organization is typically done through the use of architecture 
techniques designed to use views. These viewpoints can represent different perspectives 
in which the system can be examined; some example views are activity, process, 
organization, and data models. This report examines these viewpoints in the Innoslate 
discussion herein regarding MBSE. 
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Step five involves the analysis of the architecture objectives. This can be in the 
form of shortfall analysis, capacity analysis or interoperability analysis. An important 
facet of this step is that it contains a feedback loop to step three in which the 
architecture’s completeness is tested for both accuracy and sufficiency. If found 
inadequate, then the architecture support data is revised and required architectural 
characteristics updated. 
The final step is presenting the data to a decision maker or stakeholder. The use of 
standards, such as DODAF, insures the decision maker is able to quickly evaluate the 
content of the architecture and not waste excess time trying to understand new data 
presentation methods for each product. This key element is a major reason for selecting 
the DODAF standards for the development and evaluation of the DL and IAMD 
architectures.  
2. Model Based Systems Engineering in INNOSLATE 
Innoslate was utilized to create DODAF 2.02 viewpoints (see Figure 5), which 
take a top down approach to maintain consistency with the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS) process (SPEC Innovations 2017).  
 
Figure 5.  DODAF Viewpoints. Source: Department of Defense Chief 
Information Officer (2017). 
Tenets of Innoslate methodology follow that of the Lifecycle Modeling Language 
(LML) specification 1.1. We define Innoslate as something that can exist by itself and is 
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uniquely identifiable. The schema makes use of 22 different and unique entities, which 
they define as classes.  
We further define each entity in Innoslate by attributes. An attribute is an inherent 
characteristic or quality of an entity. It further describes the entity, enhancing its 
uniqueness (Innoslate 2017). Each entity in Innoslate can be further defined through the 
use of attributes. An attribute is an inherent characteristic or quality of an entity. It further 
describes the entity, enhancing its uniqueness (Innoslate 2017). Some examples are text, 
numbers, or percent assigned to entities.  
Finally, Innoslate allows the definition of clearly defined relationships between 
the discrete entities created. Some example relationships as defined by LML specification 
1.1 are “decomposed by,” “specified by,” and “referenced by.” The architecture 
developed in this thesis will abide by these conventions and seeks to comply with 
DODAF framework when possible. 
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III. OPERATIONAL / FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY / IAMD ARCHITECTURE 
The first step in evaluating the interactions of IAMD and DL to define a 
combined architecture to be modeled and analyzed. This chapter adapts the Model-Based 
Systems Engineering Methodology for Employing Architecture in Systems Analysis 
(MBSE MEASA) put forth by Beery (2016), which describes a methodology for 
employing architecture in system analysis. The MBSE MEASA is composed of the five 
steps displayed in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  MBSE MEASA Process. Source: Beery (2016). 
The remaining chapters are organized around this process. This chapter will first 
define clear requirements for combined DL/IAMD missions, and then develop functional 
and physical architecture in Innoslate as shown in steps two and three of the MBSE 
MEASA process. Step four of the MBSE MEASA process, presented in Chapter IV, is 
executed using ExtendSim software and a robust design of experiments (DOE). Chapter 
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four will conclude by using standard statistical methods to conduct the analysis shown in 
step five. 
1. Requirements 
The first step in creating the systems architecture is the development of concise 
requirements. System requirements provide the basis for any quality systems engineering 
process and good requirements are vital to the success of any systems engineering 
endeavor. Bahill and Dean (2005) describe the process of developing requirements in five 
steps.  
1. Elicit, analyze, validate and communicate stakeholder needs.  
2. Transform customer requirements into a derived requirement. 
3. Allocate requirements to hardware, software, test, and interface elements. 
4. Verify requirements. 
5. Validate the set of requirements. 
Traceability is also a key factor in the development of any systems engineering 
effort. In order to structure the analysis of DL and IAMD requirements a schema, was 
developed that organizes existing guidance from joint capability areas (JCAs) and the 
Unified Naval Task List (UNTL), in a consistent fashion with the terminology used in 
this thesis. Starting at the top of Figure 7, the requirements are traced to the mission 
capabilities as defined by the JCAs see (Appendix C). Next, mission capabilities are 
achieved by utilizing operational activities, which are derived through the use of the 
Unified Naval Task List (UNTL).  
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Figure 7.  Architecture Schema (cf. Figure 3). 
The requirements, for a combined IAMD and DL mission consider the relevant 
elements of both architectures and incorporate some overlap of needs. Johnson (2016) 
captured 11 high level requirements for the DL mission. Johnson (2016) argued that 
distributed lethality must provide targeting, allow for rapid AFP turnaround, and be self-
sustaining. Additionally, there are requirements to utilize current/near future resources, 
be deceptive, operate dispersed, force the adversary to react, have limited carrier strike 
group (CSG) support, execute localized sea control, integrate Marine Corps, and lastly 
DL must be offensive in nature. 
The requirements for IAMD are to be defensive; provide joint interoperability and 
integration; sense, track and discriminate contacts; provide air control; and provide 
protection against air threats, all while being mobile (CJCS 2012). Figure 8 shows an 
adaptation of Johnson’s initial requirements for DL. On the left, items highlighted in 
green are deemed to be redundant functions for DL and IAMD, items in red are re-
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addressed in the combined architecture presented on the right of Figure 8, and lastly 
items in white are identified as exclusively DL requirements.  
 
Figure 8.  Combined Requirements. Adapted from Johnson (2016). 
Development of a combined DL and IAMD requirements architecture results in a 
set of hierarchical requirements. Each requirement incorporates unambiguous, concise 
statement, which provides a consistent description of the system requirements and 
provides the traceability required in the further development of complete systems 
architecture. The combined IAMD and DL assessment yields ten distinct high-level 
requirements seen in Figures 9–11.  
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Figure 9.  Combined IAMD/DL Requirements. 
1.0 Provide targeting: The system shall provide targeting data. This 
requirement is further refined by requirements R.1.1, sense contacts, and R.1.2, track 
targets. These are fundamental requirements for both DL and IAMD systems, which must 
engage hostile enemy combatants. If the combatants cannot be targeted, then further 
engagements are not possible.  
2.0 Rapid AFP turnaround: The system shall allow for rapid re-tasking of 
the adaptive force package. The 2017 Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control 
asserts, “adaptive force packages allow operational commanders to scale force 
capabilities depending on the level of threat” (Commander Naval Surface Forces 2017, 
9). To this end, the AFP composition must be agile enough to conduct a DL mission 
while not incurring significant reduction in mission capability through emergent tasking 
from higher headquarters, such as IAMD mission tasking.  
3.0 Self-sustaining: The system shall sustain itself for the duration of the 
mission. While considering advanced logistic solutions are being considered, the ability 
to sustain forward presence and remain on station is a key capability that allows U.S. 
naval forces to maintain a competitive advantage over adversarial nations. Harlow (2016) 
defined a systems architecture for logistics of a distributed naval force stating that 
“sustain[ing] a distributed force requires a dynamic infrastructure that can respond to a 
demand signal swiftly.” He concluded that further work is needed to explore new 
capabilities, such as VLS Re-Arm at Sea (Harlow 2016). The implementation of new 
logical techniques is required to enable self-sustainment.  
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4.0 Current/Near Future Resources: The system shall incorporate current as 
well as near future resources. Advances in the development and fielding of new 
technologies are crucial for the sustainment of technical advantage. One of the three 
tenets identified for distributed lethality is to increase the offensive lethality of all 
warships (Commander Naval Surface Forces 2017). Commander Naval Surface Forces 
(CNSF) states that “our ships must be equipped with the tools necessary to fight and 
defeat highly capable adversaries” (Commander Naval Surface Forces 2017, 11). 
Achieving this requirement means the incorporation of advanced technologies. These 
technologies will include not just advanced kinetic weapons but also use of unmanned 
systems, as well as highly adaptive command-and-control systems with the ability to 
reconfigure rapidly and utilize low probability of detection methods of transmission.  
5.0 Deceptive: The system shall operate in a deceptive manner. The 
requirement to operate in a deceptive manner presents a number of challenges to 
conducting combined DL/IAMD missions. While the DL concept is inherently reliant on 
its ability to execute in a stealthy manner and remain undetected, IAMD conflict with the 
execution of deception.  
Deception can occur in a number of different ways. One such way is to reduce the 
electromagnetic signature of a vessel by the incorporating emission control (EMCON). 
By reducing or eliminating the electromagnetic signals broadcast from a vessel, the 
vessel then becomes more difficult to detect and therefore more deceptive. Integrated air 
and missile defense missions typically require an organic or local to the ship, high-
powered volume search radar to scan the sky and space for missile like objects. This 
requires the emission of large amounts of RF energy, which is easily detectable by enemy 
forces. One aspect this thesis examines is the effects of placing a ship in EMCON and 
relying on cued sensors to conduct BMD engagements in support of IAMD missions. 
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Figure 10.  Combined IAMD/DL Requirements.  
6.0 Dispersed: The system shall operate with dispersed units. Unlike the 
previous requirement, this is supportable for both IAMD and DL missions. This 
requirement is further refined by requirements R.6.1, Force the adversary to react, and 
R.6.2, Mobile. Simply stated, a mobile AFP configuration can easily be dispersed and 
force the adversary to react. 
7.0 Localized control: The system shall provide localized sea and air control. 
This requirement is further refined by R.7.1, Localized air control, and R.7.2, Localized 
sea control. This requirement directly supports the CNO’s first line of effort, “strengthen 
Naval Power at and from Sea” (CNO 2016). 
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Figure 11.  Combined IAMD/DL Requirements. 
8.0 Operate in joint environment: The system shall operate in a joint 
environment. This requirement is supported by the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force as 
R.8.1, R.8.2 and R.8.3 respectively. Both IAMD and DL can benefit from this distinct 
advantages through the incorporation of joint capabilities from all services. Advantages 
come in the form of increased battlespace awareness through the use of shared sensors, as 
well as the increased lethality offered by joint weapon systems when combined with 
naval maritime forces.  
9.0 Offensive: The system shall conduct offensive operations. Supported 
directly by requirements R.9.1, Anti-ship and R.9.2, Offensive Counter Air 
(OCA)/Attack. This requirement is the key element from which the concept of DL is 
formed. The following quote presented in a January 2015 issue of Proceeding Magazine, 
captures the strong message presented by U.S. naval leadership: 
A shift is now under way within the surface force. It is not subtle, and it is not 
accidental. The surface force is taking the offensive, to give the operational 
commander options to employ naval combat power in any antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD) environment…Increasing surface-force lethality—particularly in our 
offensive weapons and the concept of operations for surface action groups 
(SAGs)—will provide more strike options to joint-force commanders, provide 
another method to seize the initiative, and add battlespace complexity to an 
adversary’s calculus (Fanta, Gumataotao, and Rowden 2015, 1). 
This sends a clear and distinct message that the system requirement to conduct offensive 
operations is not negotiable and that DL missions must achieve this requirement. 
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10.0 Defensive: The system shall conduct defensive operations. This 
requirement is supported by requirements R.10.1 anti-cruise missile defense and R.10.2 
ballistic missile defense. To maintain control of the battlespace the local units must be 
capable of providing defense not only to themselves but also to other units or locations as 
tasked by higher headquarters. 
2. Mission Capabilities 
With clearly defined requirements created, the next step in the architecture 
development process is to define the required mission capabilities. The Department of 
Defense Directive 7045.20 defines a “capability as the ability to achieve a desired effect 
under specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and ways 
across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action” 
(DOD 2017, 10). 
Table 1 contains a tailored listing of the mission capabilities and sub-capabilities 
identified for both DL and IAMD mission. 
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Table 1.   Mission Capabilities and Sub-Capabilities 
 
 
Each of the developed capabilities is carefully mapped to a requirement and a full 
matrix of the mapping can be found in Figure 47 of Appendix D. 
Mission Capabilities Mission Sub-Capabilities
Provide Self-Defense Against Surface Threats
Conduct Offensive Operations Against Surface Threats





Suppression of Enemy Air Defensed (SEAD)
Offensive Counterair Sweep
Escort
Offensive Counterair Attack Operations
Defensive Counterair Operations
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
Provide Self-Defense Against Air and Missile Threats
Provide Maritime Air and Missile Defense
Provide Overland Air and Missile Defense
Conduct Sea-Based Missile Defense
Communications
Situational Awareness









Discrimination  and Integration
Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness 
Evaluation and Feedback
Offensive Counterair Operations






Theater Air and Missile Defense
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Figure 12.  Mapping of Requirements to Mission Capabilities. (Compare 
to Figure 7). 
3. Operational Activities 
Operational Activities are defined as what work is required, and is specified 
independently of how it is to be carried out (DODCIO 2017). For the purposes of this 
thesis, the author has chosen to leverage the existing Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) 
specifically, the Navy Tactical Tasks (NTAs). Table 2 contains a tailored listing of the 
NTAs used. The NTAs identified were converted directly into operational activities used 
in the architecture development. 
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Table 2.   Tailored Universal Naval Tactical List. 
 
 
The conversion of NTAs to operational activities can be seen in the list displaying 
OA.1 through OA.6. 
OA.1  Deploy/Conduct Maneuver: This activity includes OA.1.1 Move Naval 
Tactical Forces, OA.1.2 Navigate and Close Forces, OA.1.3 Maintain Mobility, OA.1.4 
Conduct Countermobility, OA.1.5 Dominate Operational area 
OA.2 Develop Intelligence 
OA.3 Employ Firepower: Activities for this operation include OA.3.1 Process 
Targets, OA.3.2 Attack Targets, and OA.3.3 Conduct Special Weapons Attack. 
OA.4  Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support: This activity is 
performed with the sub-tasks, OA.4.1 Arm, OA.4.2 Fuel, OA.4.3 Repair/Maintain 
Equipment,  
OA.5 Exercise Command and Control: OA.5.1 Acquire, Process and 
Communicate Information and Maintain Status, OA.5.2 Analyze and Assess Situation, 
OA.5.3 Determine and Plan Actions and Operations, OA.5.4 Direct, Lead and Coordinate 
Forces, OA.5.5 Conduct information Warfare (IW) 
Universal Naval Task List (operational activities) Sub-NTA
Move Naval Tactical Forces




NTA 2: Develop Intelligence
Process Targets
Attack Targets




Acquire, Process and Communicate 
Information and Maintain Status
Analyze and Assess Situation
Determine and Plan Actions and Operations
Direct, Lead and Coordinate Forces
Conduct Information Warfare (IW)
Enhance Survivability
Provide Security for Operational Forces
NTA 1: Deploy / Conduct Maneuver
NTA 3: Employ Firepower
NTA 4: Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support
NTA 5: Exercise Command and Control
NTA 6: Protect the Force
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OA.6  Protect the Force: OA.6.1 Enhance Survivability, OA.6.2 Provide 
Security for Operational Forces. 
Figure 13 shows how the defined schema incorporates the mapping of the mission 
capabilities to the operational activities. The matrix used for this mapping can be found in 
Figure 48 of Appendix D. 
  
Figure 13.  Mapping Mission Capabilities to Operational Activities. 
4. Operational Tasks 
The realization of an executable model requires that the generic operational 
activities developed above, which have no real method of execution, now must be further 
decomposed into operational tasks. Careful study of existing architectures and the 
processes of distributed lethality as well as integrated air and missile defense led to the 
creation of three major tasks associated with both DL and IAMD, which are plan, execute 
and recover. Figure 14 displays how these operational tasks are implemented in the 




Figure 14.  Innoslate IAMD/DL Overall Process. 
In Innoslate, one implements the operational tasks created by using action 
diagrams. While action diagrams more closely align with LML architecting methods than 
DODAF, they work well to provide the structure necessary to create an executable 
architecture. The three primary tasks of IAMD depicted using action diagrams as shown 
in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.  Innoslate IAMD Overall Process. 
The planning phase of IAMD involves eight major steps as indicated in Figure 16. 
Every IAMD mission begins with the receipt of strategic guidance from a higher 
headquarters (OT.1.1). This guidance is evaluated by the operational chain of command 
consisting of the unified commanders, naval component commander, numbered fleet 
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commanders, and varies task forces, task groups and task units. In the event of joint 
operations, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) is assigned. The JFC staff will conduct an 
operational analysis (OT.1.2) in which the primary purpose is to understand the problem 
and purpose of the operation. The JFC will then issue guidance as appropriate to enable 
the remaining planning process.  
 
Figure 16.  Innoslate Plan IAMD Process. 
Execution of IAMD is broken into three major areas and conducted with both 
operational elements as well as tactical assets. The first task is OT.2.1 Observe. This task 
is decomposed in detail in Figure 39 of Appendix B. The primary tasks completed in 
OT.2.1 are monitoring the operational and strategic environments. This involves locating, 
assessing, or estimating the adversary’s capabilities as well as their limitations and 
understanding the environment in which they will be operating. Enablers for this task are 
intelligence collection, organic sensors as well as remote linked systems.  
Once a contact is detected and sufficient information has been gathered, the 
engagement process can move through a decision point as indicated by the OR gate in 
Figure 17. This allows a decision maker to choose a defensive counter air mission or an 
offensive counter air mission. Modeling the engagement process of these tasks is further 
elaborated in 40–42 of Appendix B. 
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Figure 17.  Innoslate Execute IAMD Process. 
The final stage of the IAMD process is OT.3 recovery. This is largely an 
administrative as well as consequence and resource management process. Figure 18 
depicts the decomposition of OT.3.0 and displays the four stages of the recovery process. 
Figure 18. Innoslate Recover IAMD Process. 
The architectural development of the distributed lethality process closely 
resembles that of the IAMD processes. The overall structure of the architecture is 




Figure 19.  Innoslate Overall DL Process. 
The plan stages (Figure 20) of the DL process and policies are not yet formally 
developed therefore the architecture products created utilize the structure developed for 
the IAMD mission but adapted to include the required surface engagement elements such 
as developing an OPTASK SUW. 
 
Figure 20.  Innoslate DL Plan Process. 
Execution of DL tasks, shown in Figure 21, is accomplished in operational tasks 
OT.5.1 Observe Surface, OT.5.2 Defensive Surface and OT5.3 Offensive Surface. 
Further decomposition of these operational tasks is contained in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 21.  Innoslate DL Execute Process. 
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Finally, Figure 22 displays the last stage of the DL process, which is the recovery 
stage. This stage has four operational tasks associated with its operation. OT.6.1 and 
OT.6.2 are managing the offensive and defensive surface operations tactical 
consequences while OT.6.3 the operational and tactical leadership seek to identify the 
resources required for redeployment. Lastly, OT.6.4 is the recommendation to terminate 
surface operations and complete the DL mission. 
 




IV. SIMULATION AND ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
A. SCENARIO AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Description of Scenario 
Discrete event modeling conducted for this thesis was done in ExtendSim 
governed by the following basic assumptions. The model developed considered a 
complex asymmetric environment with multiple threats engaging various AFP 
configurations. Figure 23 provides a general layout of the red force assets as well as the 
blue force engagement elements. 
 
Figure 23.  Threat Layout and Blue Force Capabilities. 
Red force composition includes four broad categories of threats, which are 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and ships. The ballistic threats consider three 
primary threat types: long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), short-range 
ballistic missile (SRBM), and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Engagement modeling 
is not conducted for the ICBM. One should only consider the ICBM based on the effects 
that it presents on the radar systems. This includes the reduction in the probability of 
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detection resulting from increased loading on the radar processing elements and the 
resulting increase in radar resource allocation caused by tracking a complex ballistic 
target. The SRBM as well as the ASBM paths are modeled to represent a full detect-of-
engage (DTE) process including the incorporation of layered defense against the ASBM.  
The DTE process depicted on the lower portion of Figure 23 by the blue arrows 
begins with the detection of the threat by a given sensor, which is indicated by the arrow 
labeled “Threat Appears.” The model then assigns a weapon based upon the kinematics 
of the target as well as the capabilities of the blue force engagement elements. When the 
target is within weapons release range of an engagement element, the engagement will 
begin. A kill evaluation will take place, and if the target has not been destroyed, it will be 
reengaged. If the threat is not destroyed by the first engagement element within the 
assigned engagement window, then additional engagement elements will be used as the 
range is to the threat is reduced. If no engagement elements kill the red force threat, it is 
counted as a potential hit against the blue force target and further analysis is conducted to 
evaluate as a kill.  
The number of hits on the blue force targets and the percentage of red force 
targets are collected and utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of both the IAMD mission 
area as well as a combined DL and IAMD mission.  
The scenario in Figure 23 includes threats from two different anti-ship cruise 
missiles. ASCM threats differ by the speed of the threat and labeled accordingly as 
ASCM fast for a supersonic missile and ASCM slow for a subsonic missile. Aircraft 
modeling is similar and considers an aircraft type 1 as a fighter type threat and aircraft 
type 2 as bomber type threat. Finally, a single ship class represents red force surface 
threats with varying numbers of ships deployed by the red forces. Input parameter values 
are contained Tables 3 and 4.  
It is important to note, the values given for weapon capabilities and limitations are 
not actual values in order to avoid the unintentional compromise of classified materials. 
Users of this document can apply the correct values on a system at the desired level of 
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classification to assess the results. It is the author’s intent to use values that are within 
reasonable magnitude of the actual to produce valid and applicable results. 
Table 3.   ExtendSim Factor Value Assumptions 
 
 
Factor Low Value High Value Factor Low Value High Value
SM3CycleTime (s) 1.5 2.5 HarpoonPhit 0.5 0.7
SM3Speed (nm/s) 1.98 2.1 HarpoonPk 0.3 0.5
SM3PHit 0.85 0.95 HarpoonMaxRange (nm) 60 80
SM3MaxRange (nm) 900 1100 HarpoonMinRange (nm) 4 6
SM3MinRange (nm) 50 150 HarpoonSpeed (nm/s) 0.32 0.38
SM6PHit 0.5 0.95 OASUWPhit 0.8 0.9
SM6PK 0.7 0.9 OASUWPk 0.4 0.7
SM6MinRange (nm) 8 12 OASUWMaxRange (nm) 120 130
SM6CycleTime (s) 1.4 2.2 OASUWMinRange (nm) 4 6
SM6Speed (nm/s) 0.6 0.7 OASUWSpeed (nm/s) 0.36 0.4
SM6MaxRange (nm) 200 250
SM3Pk 0.7 0.95 UEWR Pd 0.6 0.8
SM2CycleTime (s) 0.9 1.2 Cobra Dane Pd 0.6 0.7
SM2Speed (nm/s) 0.6 0.7 TPY-2 Pd 0.5 0.6
SM2Phit 0.5 0.8 STSS Pd 0.65 0.75
SM2MaxRange (nm) 70 85 SKA Pka 0.25 0.35
SM2MinRange (nm) 3 5 DSP Pd 0.45 0.55
SM2Pk 0.6 0.8 DDG Type 1 SPY Radar Pd 0.85 0.95
CIWSPk 0.05 0.2 DDG Type 1 Surface Radar Pd 0.6 0.7
CIWSMaxRange (nm) 0.9 1.1 DDG Type 2 SPY Radar Pd 0.88 0.98
5inMaxRange (nm) 4.5 5.5 DDG Type 2 Surface Radar Pd 0.65 0.75
5inMinRange (nm) 1.8 2.2 CG Spy Radar Pd 0.83 0.93
5inSpeed (nm/s) 0.78 0.81 CG Surface Radar Pd 0.6 0.7
5"Pk 0.2 0.3 DDG Type 3  AMDR Radar Pd 0.92 0.99
ESSMPk 0.25 0.35 DDG Type 3 Surface Radar Pd 0.7 0.8
ESSMMaxRange (nm) 9 10.5 LCS 3D Radar Pd 0.6 0.7
ESSMMinRange (nm) 0.9 1.2 LCS Surface Radar Pd 0.15 0.25
ESSMSpeed (nm/s) 0.7 0.75 HVU Air/Surface Radar Pd 0.7 0.8
TomahawkPhit 0.65 0.85
TomahawkPk 0.4 0.6 DDG Type 1 0 4
TomahawkMaxRange (nm) 900 1050 DDG Type 2 0 3
TomahawkMinRange (nm) 8 12 DDG Type 3 0 1
TomahawkSpeed (nm/s) 0.4 0.5 CG 0 3
AGSPk 0.27 0.3 LCS 0 2
AGSMaxRange (nm) 6 8 HVU 0 1
AGSMinRange (nm) 1.8 2.2
AGSSpeed (nm/s) 0.42 0.46 PselTomahawk 0 1
PselHarpoon 0 1
EMCON Condition 0 1 PselSM-6 0 1
 Weapons Select Preference




Blue Force Weapon Properties
 34 




Factor Low Value High Value Factor Low Value High Value
DDG  Type 1 SM3 0 16 LCS Harpoon 0 0
DDG Type 1 SM6 0 20 LCS OASUW 0 8
DDG Type 1 SM2 0 26 LCS GWS Rounds 100 200
DDG Type 1 Harpoon 0 4 LCS CIWS 1000 3000
DDG Type 1 ASROC 0 6
DDG Type 1 Tomahawk 0 20 HVU CIWS 1000 3000
DDG Type 1 SEWIP 0 2 HVU OASUW 0 8
DDG Type 1 GWS Rounds 100 200
DDG Type 1 ESSM 0 32 NumSRBM 0 20
DDG Type 1 CIWS Rounds 1000 3000 SRBMDetectRange (nm) 100 600
SRBMSpeed (nm/s) 0.78 0.82
DDG  Type 2 SM3 0 0 SRBMStartRange (nm) 500 700
DDG  Type 2 SM6 0 26 NumASBM 0 20
DDG Type 2 SM2 0 32 ASBMDetectRange (nm) 20 400
DDG Type  2 ASROC 0 6 ASBMSpeed (nm/s) 1.7 1.9
DDG Type  2 Tomahawk 0 24 ASBMStartRange (nm) 300 600
DDG Type 2 SLQ-32 0 2 NUMICBM 0 6
DDG Type 2 GWS Rounds 100 200 ICBMDetectRange (nm) 1500 2500
DDG Type 2 ESSM 0 32 ICBMSpeed (nm/s) 3.8 4.5
DDG Type 2 CIWS Rounds 1000 3000 ICBMStartRange (nm) 2000 3000
NumASCM(Fast) 0 20
DDG  Type 3 SM3 0 15 ASCM(Fast)DetectRange (nm) 5 100
DDG  Type 3 SM6 0 18 ASCM(Fast)Speed (nm/s) 0.485 0.655
DDG Type 3 SM2 0 30 ASCM(Fast)StartRange (nm) 80 120
DDG Type 3 ASROC 0 6 NumASCM(Slow) 0 20
DDG Type 3 Tomahawk 0 19 ASCM(Slow)DetectRange (nm) 5 90
DDG Type 3 SEWIP 0 2 ASCM(Slow)Speed (nm/s) 0.12 0.18
DDG Type 3 AGWS Rounds 100 200 ASCM(Slow)StartRange (nm) 70 90
DDG Type 3 ESSM 0 32 NumAircraftType1 0 10
AircraftType1DetectRange (nm) 90 110
CG SM3 0 0 AircraftType1Speed (nm/s) 0.25 0.35
CG SM6 0 30 AircraftType1StartRange (nm) 110 170
CG SM2 0 50 NumAircraftType2 0 10
CG Harpoon 0 8 AircraftType2DetectRange (nm) 30 50
CG ASROC 0 10 AircraftType2Speed (nm/s) 0.15 0.165
CG Tomahawk 0 30 AircraftType2StartRange (nm) 90 110
CG SEWIP 0 2 NumShipType1 0 8
CG GWS Rounds 200 400 ShipType1DetectRange (nm) 25 35
CG ESSM 0 32 ShipType1Speed (nm/s) 15 30
CG CIWS Rounds 1000 3000 ShipType1StartRange (nm) 5 40
Mission Type 1 3
DDG Type 1 Weapons
DDG Type 2 Weapons







2. Description of ExtendSim Model 
ExtendSim software modeling incorporates the architecture developed in Chapter 
III and applies it to the scenario developed. Figure 24 presents a high-level overview of 
the behaviors represented in the ExtendSim model. Note that the probability of detection 
for each of the enemy threats is calculated in an initialization sequence (shown at the top 
of Figure 25). Distinct sequences for engagement of SRBMs, ASBMs, ASCMs (Fast), 
ASCMs (Slow), Aircraft Type 1 (Fighter), Aircraft Type 2 (Bomber) are highlighted in 
red. The sequence for the Distributed Lethality engagement is highlighted in green. Both 
the red defensive engagements and the green DL engagement are constrained by a shared 
set of resources (in terms of number of blue force ships and number of weapons available 
to each ship) shown in blue at the bottom of Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  ExtendSim Model. 
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Blue force weapon systems are all assumed to be networked and share fire control 
quality data with each other. Each ship’s sensors have unique probability of detection for 
their primary air search radar as well as their surface search radars. The sensor specific 
Pd calculations section of the model applies logic that evaluates the number of threats (T) 
and degrades a base probability of detection (
basePd ), for the specified sensor as shown in 
Table 3, by a scaling factor ( ,  ,…  ) and finally aggregates an overall aPd  for each 
threat as shown in equation 1. 
( 1) ( 2)...( )a basePd Pd T T TN          (1) 
The calculated threat aPd for a specified sensor is aggregated as shown in 
equation 2 to develop an overall probability of detection for the specified threat.  
(1 ((1 )(1 )...(1 ))overall a b nPd Pd Pd Pd       (2) 
 
Figure 25.  Probability of Detection Calculation. 
 37 
The red areas shown in Figures 24 and 26 represent the IAMD modeling section 
of the ExtendSim model. Creation of the threats occurs independently; however, a 
common resource pool provides necessary elements such as ships, missiles, and guns.  
 
Figure 26.  Threat Engagement Section. 
The green area is the DL portion of the model and includes logic to implement 
EMCON, mission type changes and weapon select logic as indicated in Tables 3 and 4 
and shown in Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27.  DL Engagement Logic. 
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Selection logic for DDG type 1 platform (shown in Figure 27) illustrates how, 
upon exiting the EMCON logic, threat routing is based on the weapon preference. A table 
of percentages ranging from 0–100% represents the commander’s likelihood of selecting 
a harpoon, maritime strike tomahawk (MST) or SM-6 to engage the red surface threat. 
Upon selection, the threat is sent the engagement section of the model. 
When conducting anti-surface engagements, a commander must choose the most 
effective weapon possible. A lack of published weapon selection doctrine for DL 
operations, as well as a need to explore the impacts of weapon selection on a DL mission, 
necessitates the use of a weapon select preference logic. The weapon selection logic is 
modeled using a space filling mixture design of experiments (DOE) shown on the left of 
Figure 28. The correlation and scatterplot matrix to the right provide a visual 
representation of the design space covered by the selected DOE and indicate that the 
design space is well covered for feasible combination of weapon select preferences, 
based on the restriction that requires the sum of the preference to be equal to one. 
 
Figure 28.  Weapon Selection DOE. 
3. Measures of Effectiveness 
Evaluation of the model requires the selection of specific measure of effectiveness 
(MOE). MOEs are used to assess the level of significates that a particular factor has on 
the response variable. The two MOEs selected for evaluation in this model are:  
MOE 1: Blue Force Vulnerability (# of hits of the opposing force on blue forces) 
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B. MOE 2: PERCENT OF TARGETS DESTROYED (# OF OPPOSING 
FORCE DESTROYED DIVIDED BY TOTAL TARGETS) EVALUATION 
The first step in conducting an evaluation of the ExtendSim model created to 
represent the architecture developed in Chapter III of this thesis is to identify the input 
(independent) and output (dependent) factors. For both MOEs, the factors identified in 
Tables 3 and 4 will be used as the inputs. The output or response variables will vary 
based on the MOE evaluated. The next step is the creation of a DOE based on the input 
variables. 
1. Design of Experiments. 
Identification of 150 input factors necessitates the use of a DOE capable of 
exploring a complex design space in a logical manner. The goal of the DOE is to reduce 
the correlation between input variables, which is easily accomplished through utilization 
of orthogonal (or, at least, nearly orthogonal) design matrices. Vieira (2012) developed a 
spreadsheet that uses a nearly orthogonal and balanced design (NOB). He states, “Nearly 
orthogonal means that the maximum absolute pairwise correlation between any two 
design columns is minimal. Nearly balanced means that for any single factor column, the 
number of occurrences for each factor level is nearly equal” (Vieira 2012). The 
spreadsheet allows for the creation of a DOE capable of examining up to 300 input 
variables using 512 design points in which 100 of the factors can be continuous and the 
remaining occur in blocks of 20 k-level discrete factors (where k = 2, 3 … 11 levels). 
The NOB design was then crossed with the previously created weapon selection 
DOE shown in Figure 29, resulting in a 5,120-point design. Each of the 10 design points 
were evaluated against every possible combination of factors created by the NOB design. 
Testing correlation of factors ensures validity of the DOE. To save space, the full 




Figure 29.  Input Variable Correlation Matrix. 
The matrix values range from -1 to +1. A value of +1 indicates a positive 
correlation and that the variables increase or decrease in a perfectly synchronized 
manner, while -1 value indicate a negative correlation indicating that while one variable 
increases the other decreases.   The correlation matrix indicates most values are near zero 
and therefore very little correlation exists between input variables in the design. 
2. MOE 1: Percent of Targets Destroyed. 
Per the design matrix presented in the previous section, the 5,120-point design 
was run in ExtendSim and output data was collected. The regression analysis indicates 
that mission type is the dominant factor. Mission type is defined by three possible 
scenarios: mission type one is a purely IAMD mission, type two is a DL mission while 
mission type three is a combined mission. Figure 30 shows a partial display of the effect 
summary. The full summary of main effects screening is included in Appendix E.  
 
Figure 30.  Partial Effects Summary for Red Forces Destroyed. 
Further analysis is required to determine which if any additional factors influence 
the defined MOE. Analysis of the mean difference in percent of red forces lost by 
mission type indicates that there is also a statistical difference when viewed by mission 
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type. A mean value of 58.5% and maximum value of 97.1% of the red forces were 
destroyed when conducting a purely IAMD mission. The number of red forces destroyed 
increased to a mean value of 69.2% and a maximum of 97.6% when the DL concept was 
applied in an IAMD environment. Figure 31, created utilizing the JMP 13 software 
package, provides a visual representation of the analysis by mission type. 
 
Figure 31.  Red Force Losses by Mission Type. 
Factor isolation is conducted by removing mission type from the modeling effects 
equation and applying it as a variable to split the analysis. While removing the mission 
type from the analysis will ultimately decrease the amount of variation described by the 
fitted model, it allows segmented analysis to occur that prioritizes the variables that have 
the most statistically significant impact on performance in each mission type. Figure 32 
shows the results of the factor isolation by mission type. 
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Figure 32.  Effect Summary by Mission Type. 
The IAMD mission model developed has a low RSquare value of 0.15, indicating 
that statistically it may have limited predictive utility. The low RSquare value is due to 
separating factor isolation necessary to view the mission areas separately. Warfare 
commanders may still find that operational utility of the model is still very relevant, and 
isolation by mission type shows that when conducting an IAMD mission the dominating 
factors are the number of missiles and performance of those missiles. Statistically 
significant factors for IAMD mission include: 
 number of SM2 on DDG Type 1 
 probability of kill for SM2 and ESSM  
 number of SM6 on Cruiser 
 max range of SM6 
 number of threat ICBM and SRBM 
 detection range of Aircraft Type 2 
 speed of ASCM 
Analysis of the factors influencing the combined mission indicates some overlap 
in the necessity for increased numbers of SM2 and SM6. The statistically significant 
factors for a combined mission are: 
 number of SM2 on DDG type 2 and 3 
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 number CIWS rounds on DDG type 2 
 number of SM6 on Cruiser 
 number of ESSM on DDG type 3 
 probability of kill for ESSM 
 probability of hit for SM6 
 cycle time for SM3 
 number of SRBM 
 detection range of ASCM Fast 
Statistically significant factors for each mission type are focused around 
performance characteristics of blue force missiles as well as the numbers of SM2s 
available to both Cruisers and Destroyers. The number of SM6s available to Destroyers 
has a significant statistical impact on the performance in both mission types. Threat 
characteristics such as the number and speed of threats showed statistical significance as 
well. 
3. MOE 2: Blue Force Vulnerability 
Initial analysis of the data is conducted using simple averaging techniques. The 
losses are averaged by mission type and Figure 33 indicates a small increase in the 
average number of blue forces lost when shifting from an IAMD mission to a combined 
IAMD/DL mission. The results of this analysis also indicate that the most capable 
platform (DDG Type 3) sustained the least losses, while the defended area incurred the 
most hits. The LCS and HVU platforms modeling included fewer layered defense options 
in comparison to other platforms and, as such, sustained a larger number of hits when 
compared to the DDGs with a layered defense system.  
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Figure 33.  Average Blue Force Losses by Mission Area. 
Further analysis to determine the implications of combining an IAMD and DL 
mission is done by using main effects screening (see Appendix E). Regression analysis of 
the results indicated that the mission type did not have a statistically significant effect on 
the number of blue forces lost. Although not statistically significant, mission type may be 
operationally significant, and analysis is conducted to examine the impact of mission 
types. EMCON condition showed a statistically significant effect and will be used for 
further analysis. 
Examination of Figure 34 shows that the mean difference in blue force losses by 
mission indicates a change from 9.84 to 10.36 yielding an increase of 0.52 or half a ship 




Figure 34.  Blue Force Losses by Mission Type and EMCON Condition. 
Analysis of EMCON conditions (Figure 35) shows losses increased from an 
average of 6.34 blue forces to 7.21 blue forces when not in an EMCON condition. 
Increases may be attributed to an EMCON change delay of five seconds, which is 
incorporated in the model to simulate the time, required to receive indication of a target 
and subsequently begin radiating radars and building a track file. 
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Figure 35.  Blue force Losses by Mission Type and EMCON condition. 
To determine the primary factors affecting blue force losses, regression analysis 
was conducted by mission type as well as by EMCON condition. Table 5 provides a 
summary of the top 10 factors that affected blue force losses.  




Initial Factor isolation of the blue force losses by EMCON condition using 
regression analysis indicated the numbers of threat missiles dominated the results (see 
Figures 53 and 54 in Appendix E). The number of threat missiles is not an easily 
actionable factor; therefore, additional regression analysis removed the number of threat 
missiles as potential components of the regression, to isolate additional factors of interest. 
Figures 36 and 37 provide the results of the regression analysis. 
 
 




Figure 37.  Tailored Blue Force Effect Summary by EMCON Condition 
(EMCON Mission). 
The tailored analysis of the blue force losses by EMCON condition results 
indicate the primary factors for non-EMCON mission are the start range of aircraft type 
2, number of SM2s on DDG type 3 as well as the number of Offensive Anti-Surface 
Warfare (OASUW) missiles. Some other important factors shown were the speed of the 
harpoon and number of harpoons on the cruiser. Interestingly, the main factors in an 
EMCON mission were the number of SM-2 and SM-6 missiles. The probability of kill 
for the SM2 and tomahawk missiles were statistically significant factors discovered in the 
regression analysis. While the results are not definitive, it is possible that the change in 
parameter impact by EMCON condition can be attributed to a reduced harpoon and 
tomahawk engagement window due to the increase in detection time resulting from the 
assumed five-second transition from an EMCON condition to having sensors available to 
engage the target. The higher speed associated with the SM6 and SM2 missiles allowed 
for more engagement opportunities in a smaller engagement window than that of the 
slower OASUW and harpoon missiles. 
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Ultimately, the discrete event simulation analysis indicates that combined 
operations can yield nearly an 11% increase in red force losses but this benefit is 
achieved at the cost of an average blue force increase of half a ship. Therefore, 
employment of the DL concept must be weighed against the acceptable level or risk 
allowed for the mission.  
 










A. KEY POINTS 
The basis for this thesis was a focus on developing an integrated architecture that 
combines integrated air and missile defense missions with the proposed distributed 
lethality concept. The developed architecture could then be used to analyze the 
performance of the DL factors in an IAMD environment.  
In Chapter I, the DL concept and IAMD mission area were introduced and the 
methodology for analysis was presented. The chosen research method is the analysis 
method, which allowed for the completion of the defined research objectives: 
 Apply standardized systems architecture tools and techniques to integrate 
architectures for IAMD and DL. 
 Develop and analyze a discrete event simulation consistent with the 
systems architecture that identifies key performance drivers and 
operational decisions that balances conflicting requirements for IAMD and 
DL. 
Chapter II introduced relevant research that has been conducted in the areas of DL 
and IAMD. The idea was presented, explaining that DL is an offensive concept, which 
takes advantage of deceptive and dispersed naval forces, and thereby, introduces an 
increased level of uncertainty for enemy commanders. Conversely, IAMD was presented 
as a warfare area, which seeks to provide defense to friendly forces in an overt manor. 
The chapter also provided a brief survey of SE tools utilized to form the foundation for 
the architectural development in Chapter III. 
Chapter III presented the MBSE MEASA process as well as the architecture 
schema utilized to develop a combined architecture. The schema presented a process that 
enabled the requirements for DL as well as IAMD to be derived, evaluated, and then 
traced to a relevant mission capability derived from JCAs. To achieve the required 
capabilities operational activities were identified using the Unified Naval Task List and 
associated NTAs. Finally, the OAs were enabled by operational tasks, all of which were 
developed using Innoslate as a tool for creating executable architectures. 
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Chapter IV presented the developed architecture and tied it to a relevant threat 
scenario, which formed the basis of the discrete event simulation model created using 
ExtendSim software. From this, a design of experiments was presented incorporating 150 
input factors to analyze their effects on the percentage of red force losses as well as the 
losses incurred by blue forces.  
Results from the architecture development and subsequent execution of the 
discrete event simulation yield the following insights based on the assumptions presented.  
1. IAMD and DL share a large number of requirements as well as operational 
activities; however, it is possible to create a shared architecture that can 
meet the demands of both IAMD missions as well as DL missions. 
2. There is a statistically significant difference in terms of the percent of red 
forces lost when conducting a IAMD mission vs a combined mission, 
which results in the ability to destroy a greater number of red forces when 
conducting a combined mission. 
3. Number and performance of blue force weapons has a statistically 
significant impact of the number of red force casualties.  
4. EMCON condition is a distinguishing factor, which must be considered 
when conducting combined operations. 
The distributed lethality concept provides for a new and innovative approach to 
warfighting that shifts naval tactics to a more offensive paradigm. This shift is one that 
requires consideration in the development of supporting technologies. This research 
indicates that by leveraging standardized systems engineering tools, and developing 
architectures that fully embrace offensive and defensive warfighting requirements, 
development of systems that can provide the necessary capabilities to achieve individual 
or combined mission sets is promising.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The concept of DL is still very much in the early stages of development. While 
this thesis presented some of the prior research that has been conducted and further added 
to the body of knowledge, there are still a number of opportunities to enhance the 
understanding of the DL concept and the implications it may have on other warfighting 
areas. Some potential areas of future research include the following: 
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(1) Classified adaptation of the discrete event simulation 
While a succinct architecture has been created and modeled, the outputs of the 
model are a direct reflection of the input assumptions. All assumptions and perimeter 
estimations were made based on unclassified research. A researcher could support 
advancements in the research of the impact of DL in an IAMD environment by 
implementing a classified adaptation of this research. The architecture development and 
simulation using Innoslate and ExtendSim software can be quickly replicated in a secure 
computing environment and results will support further decision making by warfighting 
and technology development leadership. 
(2) Integration of unmanned systems to the architecture and simulation 
The scope of the modeling to examine the interaction of DL and IAMD 
considered traditional naval forces structures. Further research would benefit from 
adapting a refined model to consider the effects of unmanned systems. The proliferation 
of unmanned technologies may play an advantageous roll in the completion of both 
missions using systems to increase situational awareness, aid in the preparation of the 
battlespace, conduct remote engagements, or store large quantities of missiles.  
(3) High fidelity modeling of factors impacting probability of detection 
The factors that affect the probability of detections are complex and change as a 
function of time, threat, range, radar cross section, environment and more. A more 
elaborate calculation to determine the impact of high-density threat environments on 
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APPENDIX A. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (IAMD) TIER I 
 
Figure 39.  IAMD Tier I. Source: Joint Staff J6 (2013). 
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APPENDIX B. INNOSLATE ARCHITECTURE PRODUCTS. 
A. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PRODUCTS 
 
Figure 40 provides an overview of IAMD Operational Task 2.1 Observe: 
 
Figure 40.  IAMD Operational Task Observe. 
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IAMD Operational Task 2.2 Defensive Counter Air: 
 
 
Figure 41.  IAMD Operational Task Defensive Counter Air. 
IAMD Operational Task 2.2.1 Ballistic Missile Defense: 
 
Figure 42.  IAMD Operational Task Ballistic Missile Defense. 
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IAMD Operational Task 2.2.2 Anti-cruise Missile Defense: 
 
Figure 43.  IAMD Operational Task Anti-cruise Missile Defense. 
B. DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY PRODUCTS 
 
Figure 44 provides and overview of DL Operational Task 5.1 Observe: 
 
Figure 44.  DL Operational Task Observe. 
 60 
DL Operational Task 2.2 Defensive Surface: 
 
  
Figure 45.  DL Operational Task Defensive Surface. 
DL Operational Task 2.3 Offensive Surface: 
 
 
Figure 46.  DL Operational Task Offensive Surface. 
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APPENDIX C. JOINT CAPABILITY AREAS 
 
Figure 47.  Joint Capability Areas. Source: Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Research, Development and Acquisition, Chief Systems Engineer 
(ASN RDA, CHENG) (2007). 
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APPENDIX D. ARCHITECTURE MAPPING 
 
Figure 48.  Requirements to Capabilities Mapping. 
 
C.0 Combined DL and IAMD
C.1 Surface Warfare
C.1.1 Provide Self-Defense Against Surface Threats
C.1.2 Conduct Offensive Operations Against Surface Threats
C.2 Maritime Interdiction
C.2.1 Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Disruption
C.2.2 Maritime Interception Operations
C.3 Maneuver
C.3.1 Forward Presence
C.3.2 Marine Force Configurations
C.3.3 Informational Operations
C.4 Offensive Counterair Operations
C.4.1 Suppression of Enemy Air Defensed (SEAD)
C.4.2 Offensive Counterair Sweep
C.4.3 Escort
C.4.4 Offensive Counterair Attack Operations
C.5 Integrated Air and Missile Defense
C.5.1 Defensive Counterair Operations
C.5.2 Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
C.6 Theater Air and Missile Defense
C.6.1 Provide Self-Defense Against Air and Missile Threats
C.6.2 Provide Maritime Air and Missile Defense
C.6.3 Provide Overland Air and Missile Defense
C.6.4 Conduct Sea-Based Missile Defense
C.7 Command and Control
C.7.1 Communications
C.7.2 Situational Awareness






C.8.1 Planning and Direction for Collection and ISR
C.8.2 Observation and Collection
C.8.3 Processing and Exploitation
C.8.4 Analysis and Production
C.8.5 Discrimination and Integration
C.8.6 Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 49.  CV-6 Capability to Operational Activities Mapping. 
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APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 50.  MOE 1: Red Force Main Effects Screening. 
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Figure 51.  MOE 2: Blue Force Main Effects Screening. 
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Figure 52.  Blue Force Effect Summary by IAMD Mission Type. 
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Figure 53.  Blue Force Effect Summary by Combined Mission Type. 
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Figure 54.  Blue Force Effect Summary No EMCON Mission. 
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